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Abstract
If we could define the set of all bad outcomes, we could hard-code an agent which avoids them;
however, in sufficiently complex environments, this is infeasible. We do not know of any general-
purpose approaches in the literature to avoiding novel failure modes. Motivated by this, we define
an idealized Bayesian reinforcement learner which follows a policy that maximizes the worst-case
expected reward over a set of world-models. We call this agent pessimistic, since it optimizes
assuming the worst case. A scalar parameter tunes the agent’s pessimism by changing the size of the
set of world-models taken into account. Our first main contribution is: given an assumption about
the agent’s model class, a sufficiently pessimistic agent does not cause “unprecedented events” with
probability 1−δ, whether or not designers know how to precisely specify those precedents they are
concerned with. Since pessimism discourages exploration, at each timestep, the agent may defer to
a mentor, who may be a human or some known-safe policy we would like to improve. Our other
main contribution is that the agent’s policy’s value approaches at least that of the mentor, while
the probability of deferring to the mentor goes to 0. In high-stakes environments, we might like
advanced artificial agents to pursue goals cautiously, which is a non-trivial problem even if the
agent were allowed arbitrary computing power; we present a formal solution.
1. Introduction
Intuitively, there are contexts in which we would like advanced agents to be conservative: novel
action-sequences should be treated with caution, and only taken when the agent is quite sure its
world-model generalizes well to this untested new idea. For a weak agent in a simple environment,
the following approach may suffice: model the environment as finite-state Markov, observe a men-
tor, and only take actions that you have already observed the mentor take from the current state. But
in a complex environment, one never or hardly ever sees the exact same state twice; even worse, if
the environment is non-stationary, a previous observation of the mentor taking action a from state s
does not imply it is still safe to do so.
We construct an idealized Bayesian reinforcement learner. We do not assume our agent’s en-
vironment is finite-state Markov or ergodic. We will only assume that our agent’s environment,
which may depend on the entire interaction history, belongs to a countable set M. For example,
the countable set of semicomputable stochastic world-models would be large enough to make this
c© 2020 M.K. Cohen & M. Hutter.
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assumption innocuous (Hutter, 2005). The limit of this idealization is that because we make so few
assumptions, we can’t ensure that computing the posterior is tractable in the general setting.
Our agent also has a mentor, who can select an action when the agent requests, and we assume
nothing about the agent’s mentor besides belonging to a countable set of possible policies P. The
mentor could be a human or a known-safe policy.
Our agent starts with a prior that assigns non-zero probability to a countable set of world-models
M and mentor-models P, and recursively updates a posterior. At each timestep, it stochastically
defers to a mentor with some probability, and the mentor selects the action on its behalf; otherwise, it
takes the top world-models in its posterior until they cover some fixed fraction β of the posterior, and
it follows a policy which maximizes the minimum expected return among those top world-models.
We call this minimum the pessimistic value because it is a worst-case estimate. At each timestep,
to decide whether to defer action-selection to the mentor, the agent samples a world-model and
mentor-model from its posterior; the agent calculates the value of acting according to that mentor-
model in that world-model given the current interaction history, and if that value is greater than the
pessimistic value plus positive noise, or if the pessimistic value is 0, the agent defers. This query
probability is inspired by the effectiveness of Thompson Sampling (Thompson, 1933).
We show
• In the limit, the pessimistic agent’s policy’s value approaches at least that of the mentor’s.
(Corollary 6)
• The mentor is queried with probability approaching 0 as t→∞. (Corollary 7)
• For any complexity class C , we can setM so that for any event E in the class C , we can set
β so that with arbitrarily high probability: for the whole lifetime of the agent, if the event E
has never happened before, the agent will not make it happen. Either the mentor will take an
action on the agent’s behalf which makes E happen for the first time, or E will never happen.
(Theorem 11)
We call the last point the Probably Respecting Precedent Theorem. The “precedent” is that
a certain event has never happened, and the agent probably never takes an action which disrupts
that precedent for the first time. For any failure mode that designers do not know how to specify
formally, the agent can be made to probably not fail that way. The price of this is intractability, but
tractable approximations of pessimism may preserve these results in practice, or perhaps even in
theory. When we discover good heuristics for Bayesian reasoning, that rising tide will lift this boat.
Section 2 introduces notation, Section 3 reviews related work, we define the agent’s policy in
Section 4, and we prove performance results and safety results in Sections 5 and 6. Appendix
A collects definitions and notation, Appendix B presents an algorithm for an ε-approximation of
the agent’s policy, Appendix C contains omitted proofs, and Appendix D contains an informal
discussion.
2. Notation
Let A, O, and R be finite sets of possible actions, observations, and rewards. Let {0, 1} ⊂ R ⊂
[0, 1]. Let H = A×O×R. For each timestep t ∈ N, at, ot, and rt denote the action, ob-
servation, and reward, and ht denotes the triple. A policy pi can depend on the entire history so
far. We denote this history (h1, h2, ..., ht−1) as h<t. Policies may be stochastic, outputting a dis-
tribution over actions. Thus, pi : H∗  A, where H∗ =
⋃∞
i=0H
i, and  means the function
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may be stochastic. Likewise, in general, a world-model ν : H∗ × A  O×R may be stochas-
tic, and it may depend on the entire interaction history. The latter possibility allows (the agent to
conceive of) environments which are not finite-state Markov. A policy pi and a world-model ν in-
duce a probability measure Ppiν over infinite interaction histories. This is the probability of events
when actions are sampled from pi and observations and rewards are sampled from ν. Formally,
Ppiν (h≤t) =
∏t
k=1 pi(ak|h<k)ν(okrk|h<kak). We use general, history-based world-models, with no
assumptions on ν ∈ M, even though they present complications that finite-state Markov, ergodic
world-models do not.
The agent will maintain a belief distribution over a class of world-models M. We allow this
to be an arbitrary countable set. A prime example, the set of semicomputable stochastic world-
models MCOMP (Hutter, 2005), is only countable, but large enough. The agent starts with a prior
belief w(ν) that the world-model ν ∈ M is the true environment (w is for “weight”). Naturally,∑
ν∈Mw(ν) = 1. The agent updates its belief distribution according to Bayes’ rule, which we write
as follows: w(ν|h<t) :∝ w(ν)
∏t−1
k=1 ν(okrk|h<kak), normalized so that
∑
ν∈Mw(ν|h<t) = 1.
Let µ be the true environment. We assume µ ∈ M, and we assume the true observed rewards are at
least εr > 0. (The assumption that rewards belong to a bounded interval is ubiquitous in RL).
For an agent with a discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1), and a policy pi, given a world-model ν, and an
interaction history h<t, the value of that policy from that position in that world is
V piν (h<t) := (1− γ)E
pi
ν
[
∞∑
k=t
γk−trk
∣∣∣∣∣h<t
]
(1)
where Epiν is the expectation under the probability measure P
pi
ν . The factor of 1 − γ normalizes the
value to [0, 1] for convenience.
3. Related Work
Virtually all previous work that attempts to make reinforcement learners avoid unspecified failure
modes assumes a finite-state Markov environment. We do not, but the literature is nonetheless
informative for our general setting.
Heger (1994) defines Qˆ-learning, which maximizes the worst-case return for a known MDP,
and Jiang et al. (1998) extend the case to unknown MDPs. As Garcı´a and Ferna´ndez (2015) de-
scribe, Gaskett (2003) found empirically that such extreme pessimism is more harmful than helpful.
Gaskett (2003) introduces a variant on the Q-value, which is the value of an action under the as-
sumption that at each future timestep, with some probability, the worst action will be taken, instead
of the best one; they test this empirically.
Closer to our approach, Iyengar (2005) and Nilim and El Ghaoui (2005) construct a policy
which is robust to errors in the transition probabilities by considering the worst-case return within
some error tolerance. Much of the work on the topic takes the form of presenting a tractable ap-
proach to the execution of this robust policy, e.g. Tamar et al. (2013). Unfortunately, this research
assumes access to an MDP with (approximately) known transition probabilities—at first glance this
seems like something an agent might reasonably have access to after limited observations, but the
MDPs are assumed to be uniformly approximately known, which requires exploration, and indeed
requires observing every “failure” state that the robust policies are supposed to avoid. The finite-
state Markov assumption their work makes is useful for many circumstances, but advanced agents
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may have to conceive of non-stationarity in the environment, and importantly for our purposes,
novel failure modes.
Other work makes use of a mentor to avoid “dangerous” states (whereas in our work, the mentor
lower-bounds the capability of the agent, and robustness derives from pessimism). Imitation learn-
ing (Abbeel and Ng, 2004; Ho and Ermon, 2016; Ross et al., 2011) makes the most of a mentor in
the absence of other feedback, like rewards. An abundance of “ask for help” algorithms query a
mentor under conditions which correspond to some form of uncertainty (Clouse, 1997; Hans et al.,
2008; Garcı´a and Ferna´ndez, 2012; Garcı´a et al., 2013). Kosoy (2019) gives a regret bound for an
agent in a (non-ergodic) MDP, given access to an expert mentor and a finite set of models that
contains the truth. Garcı´a and Ferna´ndez (2015, Section 4.1.3.2) review many protocols by which a
mentor monitors the state and intervenes at will through various channels, and Saunders et al. (2018)
is another more recent example. One risk of relying on mentor-intervention to protect against crit-
ical failure is that a mentor may not recognize action sequences which lead to critical failure, even
if we would trust a mentor not to wander into those failure modes by virtue of their complexity.
Sunehag and Hutter’s (2015) optimistic agent directly inspired this work; optimism is designed
to be an exploration strategy. Hutter’s (2005) formulation of universal artificial intelligence is the
basic theoretical framework we use here to analyze idealized artificial agents. Technically, our
work borrows most from Hutter’s (2009b), Leike et al.’s (2016), and Cohen et al.’s (2020) work on
Bayesian agents with general countable model-classes.
4. Agent Definition
We now define the pessimistic policy and the probability with which the agent defers to a mentor.
We define the agent’s policy mathematically here, and we write an algorithm in Appendix B.
4.1. Pessimism
β ∈ (0, 1) will tune the agent’s pessimism. If, for example, β = 0.95, we say that the agent is
95% pessimistic. Such an agent will restrict attention to a set of world-models that covers 95% of
its belief distribution, and act to maximize expected reward in the worst-case scenario among those
world-models. Formally, let νk be the world-model inM with the kth largest posterior weight, and
let T k be the top-k most probable world-models, defined as follows:
T 0(h<t) := ∅ (2) νk(h<t) := argmax
ν∈M\T k−1(h<t)
w(ν|h<t) (3)
T k(h<t) := T k−1(h<t) ∪ {ν
k(h<t)} (4)
Ties in the argmax are broken arbitrarily (as everywhere else in the paper). Then,
kβt := min
k ∈ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
ν∈T k(h<t)
w(ν|h<t) > β
 (5)
Mβt := T kβt
(h<t) (6)
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Note that kβt andM
β
t both depend on h<t, not just t, and note thatM
β
t satisfies∑
ν∈Mβt
w(ν|h<t) > β (7)
The β-pessimistic policy is defined as follows:
piβt := argmax
pi∈Π
min
ν∈Mβt
V piν (h<t) (8)
piβ(·|h<t) := pi
β
t (·|h<t) (9)
Π is the set of all deterministic policies, and some deterministic policy will always be optimal
(Lattimore and Hutter, 2014). The connection to the minimax approach in game theory is inter-
esting: from Equation 8, it looks as though the pessimistic agent believes there is an adversary in
the environment. Our policy is inspired by Sunehag and Hutter’s (2015) optimistic agent, in which
the min is replaced with a max, and Mβt is replaced with an arbitrary finite subset of the model
class. Whereas the purpose of optimism is to encourage exploration, the purpose of pessimism is to
discourage novelty.
4.2. The Mentor
Since pessimism discourages exploration, we introduce a mentor to demonstrate a policy. We sup-
pose that at any timestep, the agent may defer to a mentor, who will then select the action on the
agent’s behalf. Thus, the agent can choose to follow the mentor’s policy pim, not by computing it,
but rather by querying the mentor. pim may be stochastic. What remains to be defined is when the
agent queries the mentor.
The agent maintains a posterior distribution over a set of mentor-models. Each mentor-model
is a policy pi ∈ P, an arbitrary countable set, and let w′(pi) be the prior probability that the agent
assigns to the proposition that the mentor samples actions from pi. Letting qk = 1 if the agent
queried the mentor at timestep k, and letting qk = 0 otherwise, the posterior belief w
′(pi|h<t) :∝
w′(pi)
∏
k<t:qk=1
pi(ak|h<k).
At timestep t, the agent follows the following procedure to determine whether to query the
mentor. pˆit ∼ w
′(·|h<t). νˆt ∼ w(·|h<t). Sampling from a posterior is often called Thompson
Sampling (Thompson, 1933). Xt := V
pˆit
νˆt
(h<t). Yt := maxpi∈Πminν∈Mβt
V piν (h<t). Let Zt > 0 be
an i.i.d. random variable such that for all ε > 0, p(Zt < ε) > 0, e.g. Zt ∼ Uniform((0, 2]). If
Xt > Yt + Zt, or if Yt = 0, the agent defers to the mentor. For ease of analysis, we also require
p(Zt > 1) > 0. The greater the possibility that the mentor can accrue much more reward, the higher
the probability of deferring.
When Yt = 0, we call this the “zero condition.” Our earlier assumption that the true observed
rewards be at least εr > 0 is to ensure the zero condition only happens finitely often. The agent will
still consider it possible to get zero reward, but it will never actually observe such a thing. Let θt
denote the probability that qt = 1 and the agent defers to the mentor; note that θt depends on the
whole history, not just t.
The pessimistic agent’s policy, which mixes between piβ (from Eqn. 9) and pim according to its
query probability, is denoted piβZ ; that is, pi
β
Z(·|h<t) := θtpi
m(·|h<t) + (1− θt)pi
β(·|h<t).
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5. Performance Results
We now present our first contribution: we show that value of the agent’s policy will at least approach,
and perhaps exceed, the value of the mentor’s policy. We also show that the probability of querying
the mentor approaches 0. In the next section, we will prove results regarding the safety of the agent.
We begin with a lemma regarding Bayesian sequence prediction: the β-maximum a posteriori
models—that is, the minimal set of models that amount to at least β of the posterior—all “merge”
with the true world-model. We require some new notation to define this formally.
Let x<∞ ∈ X
∞; that is, it is an infinite string from a finite alphabet X . Let x<t be the first t−1
characters of x<∞. We consider probability measures over the outcome space Ω = X
∞, with the
standard event space being the σ-algebra of cylinder sets: F = σ({{x<ty|y ∈ X
∞}|x<t ∈ X
∗}).
We abbreviate x<∞ as ω. We will consider a countable class of probability measures over this space
M = {Qi}i∈N. One such probability measure will be denoted P (the true sampling one), and Q
will denote an arbitrary probability measure over X∞.
We will write P (x<t) to mean the probability that the infinite string ω begins with x<t; so
technically, it is shorthand for P ({x<ty|y ∈ X
∞}). By P (x′|x<t) (for x
′ ∈ X ∗), we mean
P (x<tx
′)/P (x<t), that is, the probability that x
′ follows x<t. We begin with prior weights over
Q ∈ M, denoted w(Q) > 0, and satisfying
∑
Q∈Mw(Q) = 1, and we let the posterior weight be
w(Q|x<t) :=
w(Q)Q(x<t)∑
Q′∈Mw(Q
′)Q′(x<t)
(10)
ForM′ ⊂M, we also define w(M′ |·) =
∑
Q∈M′ w(Q|·).
The k-step variation distance between P and Q is how much they can possibly differ on the
probability of what the next k characters might be (Hutter, 2005).
Definition 1 (k-step variation distance)
dk(P,Q|x<t) = max
E⊂Xk
∣∣P (E|x<t)−Q(E|x<t)∣∣
Definition 2 (Total variation distance)
d(P,Q|x<t) = lim
k→∞
dk(P,Q|x<t)
which exists because dk(P,Q|x<t) is non-decreasing and bounded by 1.
Inspired by Blackwell and Dubins (1962), the following lemma may interest some Bayesians
more than any of our theorems. Defining Mβt exactly as before (see Equations 2 - 6), but for
Q ∈ M instead of for ν ∈ M, and conditioning on x<t instead of h<t,
Lemma 3 (Merging of Top Opinions) For β ∈ (0, 1), limt→∞maxQ∈Mβt
d(P,Q|x<t) = 0 with
P -probability 1 (i.e. when x<∞ = ω ∼ P ).
Unless otherwise specified, all limits in this paper are as t → ∞. This lemma is proven in
Appendix C, and it requires a few lemmas that are stated and proven there as well. Among these,
Lemma 20 is a beautiful one that we feel should be known, but we couldn’t find it in the literature. It
says the sum of the limits of posterior weights is 1, a.s.:
∑
Q∈M limw(Q|x<t) = 1 with P -prob.1,
for P ∈ M. The others are short results from recent papers; we restate them there and re-prove
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them when feasible to save the reader the trouble of translating notation and verifying that those
results apply to our current problem. Roughly, Lemma 3 holds because when a true model has
positive prior weight, all models either merge with the truth or have their posterior weight go to 0,
so eventually, all top models must merge; but the set of top models changes with each observation,
and limits require care, so it ends up being somewhat involved.
We now return to the probability space where infinite sequences are over the alphabet H, and
probability measures Ppiν denote the probability when actions are sampled from a policy pi and
observations and rewards are sampled from a world-model ν. Since piβZ is the agent’s policy, and µ
is the true environment, we will often abbreviate “with P
piβ
Z
µ -probability 1” as just “with probability
1” or “w.p.1”. We assume, for the remaining results: M ∋ µ, and P ∋ pim.
Further lemmas which depend on the Merging of Top Opinions Lemma are stated in Appendix
C. They are: with probability 1, on-policy prediction converges, the zero condition occurs only
finitely often, and “almost-on-policy prediction” converges, which is roughly that if the agent’s
policy mimics another policy pit with some uniformly positive probability some of the time, then on
those timesteps, on-pit-policy prediction converges to the truth. Formally,
Lemma 4 (Almost On-Policy Convergence) For a sequence of policies pit and an infinite set of
timesteps τ , the following holds with P
piβ
Z
µ -prob. 1: if there exists c > 0 such that ∀t ∈ τ ∀t′ ≥
t ∀a ∈ A piβZ(a|h<t′) ≥ cpit(a|h<t′), then limτ∋t→∞ V
pit
µ (h<t)−minν∈Mβt
V pitν (h<t) = 0 and for
all k, limτ∋t→∞maxν∈Mβt
dk
(
Ppitν ,P
pit
µ
∣∣∣h<t) = 0.
The proof is in Appendix C; if it didn’t hold, on-policy prediction error would be bounded below
at those timesteps τ . Our main performance results are corollaries of the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (Exploiting Surpasses Exploring)
lim inf w(ν|h<t)w
′(pi|h<t) > 0 =⇒ lim inf V
piβ
µ (h<t)− V
pi
ν (h<t) ≥ 0 w.p.1
Informally, for any world-model/mentor-model pair that remains possible, the true value of
the pessimistic policy will be at least as high. A note on the proof: we will consider an infinite
interaction history which violates the theorem, follow implications that hold with probability 1, and
arrive at a contradiction. Strictly speaking, we are considering the set of infinite interaction histories
which violate the theorem and for which all the implications we employ are true. The resulting set
of infinite interaction histories will be ∅ once we arrive at a contradiction, so it will have probability
0. Since all implications used in the proof have probability 1 (and we only employ countably many
such implications), the negation of the theorem must also have probability 0 by countable additivity.
Since it is tedious to keep track of sets of outcomes for which each line in the proof holds, we simply
treat implications that hold with probability 1 as if they were true logical implications, but as we
have just argued, as long as this is not done uncountably many times, this is a valid style of proof.
Most of the proof is a lengthy proof by induction; we set up the proof by induction and outline
the remainder, which is completed in Appendix C.
Proof – Detailed Outline Fix an infinite interaction history h<∞. Suppose lim inf w(ν
′|h<t) ·
w′(pi′|h<t) > 0. This implies inft w(ν
′|h<t)w
′(pi′|h<t) > 0, because if a posterior is ever 0, it
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will always be 0. Let ν ′inf > 0 and pi
′
inf > 0 denote those two infima. Let τ
× = {t : V pi
′
ν′ (h<t) >
V pi
β
µ (h<t) + 7ε}. Suppose by contradiction that |τ
×| =∞ for some ε > 0.
The proof proceeds by induction. Let V pi1k;pi2ν (h<t) denote the value of following pi1 for k
timesteps, and following pi2 thereafter. Let τ−1 = N, the set of all timesteps. For k ∈ N, tk and τk
are defined inductively. Let α = max{β, 1 − ν ′inf/2}.
Let tk be a timestep after which maxν∈Mαt |V
pi′k;piβ
ν (h<t)− V
pi′k;piβ
µ (h<t)| < ε and maxν∈Mαt
dk
(
Ppi
′
ν ,P
pi′
µ
∣∣∣h<t) < ε for all t ∈ τk−1 (if such a timestep exists). Recalling θt is the query
probability, let τk be the set of timesteps t ∈ τk−1 ∧ t ≥ tk ∧ (∀t
′ < k : θt+t′ ≥ ν
′
infpi
′
infp(Zt+t′ <
ε)) ∧ V pi
′
ν′ (h<t+k) ≥ V
piβ
µ (h<t+k) + 2ε. We abbreviate the third condition of τk “A(t, k)”—the
query probability is bounded below for k timesteps starting at t. We also restrict τ0 ⊂ τ
×. Now
we show that t0 exists with probability 1, and |τ0| = ∞ with probability 1, and if tk exists and
|τk| =∞, then with probability 1, tk+1 exists and |τk+1| =∞.
The remainder of the proof is in Appendix C. The proof by induction roughly proceeds as
follows: from V pi
′
ν′ (h<t+k) ≥ V
piβ
µ (h<t+k)+ 2ε, we show the agent will explore again at time t+ k
with uniformly positive probability, so A(t, k + 1) holds. Then we can apply Lemma 4, and show
that piβZ > cpi
′ for those k + 1-timestep intervals, so predictions regarding the next k + 1 timesteps
on-pi′-policy converge to the truth (for those certain intervals), which implies tk+1 exists. Because
|τ×| =∞, V pi
′
ν′ must exceed V
piβ
µ by 7ε infinitely often. The k+1-step convergence of pi
′ effectively
pushes back this value difference to mostly arise from events at least k + 1 steps in the future; if
rewards differed earlier, the pessimistic value of pi′ would be higher than piβ , but piβ maximizes
the pessimistic value. The value difference “being pushed back” is captured as V pi
′
ν′ (h<t+k+1) ≥
V pi
β
µ (h<t+k+1) + 2ε, which is the last step in the induction.
But the value difference cannot be pushed back indefinitely. The exact form of the contradiction
is an implication of the inductive hypothesis: that γk+1 ≥ 3ε, but this cannot hold as k →∞. This
is our contradiction, after following implications that hold with probability 1, so the negation of the
theorem, which we supposed at the beginning, has probability 0.
Corollary 6 (Mentor-Level Performance) lim inf V pi
β
µ (h<t)− V
pim
µ (h<t) ≥ 0 w.p.1.
Thus, the pessimistic agent learns to accumulate reward at least as well as the mentor. This is
our main performance result. It is easy to construct environments where piβ surpasses pim (see, e.g.,
Theorem 15).
Proof By Lemma 25, inftw(µ|h<t)w
′(pim|h<t) > 0, with probability 1. This satisfies the condition
of Theorem 5, so the implication holds with probability 1.
Corollary 7 (Limited Querying) θt → 0 w.p.1.
The proof is in Appendix C. The intuition is that the query probability is roughly the probability
that querying the mentor could yield much more value than acting pessimistically, and we know
from Corollary 6 that this probability goes to 0.
Ideally, we would have finite bounds instead of merely asymptotic results. Unfortunately, to our
knowledge, no finite performance bounds have been discovered for agents in general environments,
except for on-policy prediction error. Regret bounds are impossible in general environments, unfor-
tunately, due to traps (Hutter, 2005, §5.3.2). Finding the strongest notion of optimality attainable in
general environments is an open problem (Hutter, 2009a).
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6. Safety Results
Roughly, we now show that for any event that has never happened before, a sufficiently pessimistic
agent probably does not unilaterally cause that event to happen.
For that result (roughly) the model class must contain models that can “detect” whether the event
in question occurs. Thus, we add some structure to the model class M: we assume M includes
all world-models in some complexity class. Let F and G be sets of functions mapping N → N.
CFG = TIME(F) ∩ SPACE(G). For example, if F =
⋃∞
k=0O(t
k) and G = N→ N (the set of all
functions), then CFG = P.
Definition 8 (FCFG) FCFG is the set of world-models ν for which there exists a program such that
given an infinite action sequence and access to infinite random bits,
• it outputs an infinite sequence of observations and rewards, distributed according to ν
• the tth observation and reward are output before the t+ 1th action is read
• for some f ∈ F and some g ∈ G, when the tth observation and reward have been output,
– the runtime is less than f(t)
– the space used is less than g(t)
We assume that F and G such that the true environment µ ∈ M = FCFG . We assume F and
G are closed under addition, and F ⊃ O(t). By picking F and G, we can make our agent avoid
“unprecedented events” that belong to particular complexity classes.
Definition 9 (To Happen) For an event E ⊂ H∗ ×A, E happens at time t if h<tat ∈ E.
Definition 10 (To Have Happened) For E ⊂ H∗ × A, and for an interaction history h<tat, E
has happened if there exists a t′ ≤ t such that h<t′at′ ∈ E.
Let E← denote the set of interaction histories for which E has happened. Let F/t = {f/t |f ∈
F}. We now present our main safety result:
Theorem 11 (Probably Respecting Precedent) Let E ⊂ H∗ ×A be an event for which the deci-
sion problem h<tat ∈
? E is in the complexity class C(F/t)G . As β approaches 1, the probability of
the following event goes to 1: for all t, if at time t− 1, E has not happened, then E will not happen
at time t either, unless perhaps the mentor selects at. Formally, for some constant cE > 0,
E ∈ C(F/t)G =⇒ P
piβ
Z
µ [∀t (h<t−1at−1 /∈ E← =⇒ h<tat /∈ E ∨ qt = 1)] ≥ 1−
1− β
cEw(µ)
Note the latter possibility qt = 1 has diminishing probability by Corollary 7. Suppose E is the
set of interaction histories which cause some catastrophe, and we trust the mentor not to cause this
catastrophe. Then the Probably Respecting Precedent Theorem implies that running a sufficiently
pessimistic agent will probably not cause this catastrophe—if it hasn’t happened yet, the agent
probably won’t make it happen, and if the mentor won’t make it happen, it probably won’t ever
happen. This theorem holds even for catastrophes we can’t recognize immediately, and it holds
even if we don’t know how to describe the event. Finally, the factor of w(µ) is less of a bother than
it appears; if the agent’s lifetime were preceded by N mentor-led actions, and the posterior after
that became the new prior, the “prior” on µ could practically be made quite large.
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Proof idea Let µE be identical to the true world-model µ until the event E happens, at which
point, reward is zero forever according to that model. With high probability, the world-model µE
will always be included in Mβt if β is large enough. If E has never happened, this world-model
stays inMβt , and the pessimistic value (when µE is included) of causing the event E to happen is
0, which means that either some other action will be preferred, or the agent will defer to the mentor
if the pessimistic value of every action is 0.
Proof Let µE be the environment which mimics µ as long as E has not happened, and then if E
happens, rewards are 0 forever (and for the sake of precision, we say observations are unchanged, but
this doesn’t matter). That is, µE(otrt|h<tat) = µ(otrt|h<tat) if h<tat /∈ E←, and if h<tat ∈ E←,
µE(rt = 0|h<tat) = 1.
µ ∈ FCFG and E ∈ C(F/t)G . Consider a program which computes µE by running µ in f(t)
time and g(t) space, but also checks at every timestep whether h<tat ∈ E (and then switches to
outputting 0 reward if this ever happens), which requires only f ′(t)/t time and g′(t) space for some
f ′ ∈ F and g′ ∈ G. The total space requirements are now g(t) + g′(t) ∈ G because G is closed
under addition. The total time requirements are now f(t) +
∑t
k=1 f
′(k)/k. Because F ⊃ O(t),
f ′ can be increased if necessary so that f ′(k)/k is non-decreasing, so f(t) +
∑t
k=1 f
′(k)/k ≤
f(t) +
∑t
k=1 f
′(t)/t = f(t) + f ′(t) ∈ F , since F is closed under addition. Thus, µE ∈ FCFG , so
µE ∈M, andw(µE) > 0. Let cE = w(µE)/w(µ). If h<t−1at−1 /∈ E←,
∏
k<t µE(okrk|h<kak) =∏
k<t µ(okrk|h<kak), so
h<t−1at−1 /∈ E← =⇒ w(µE |h<t) = cEw(µ|h<t) (11)
As shown in Lemma 25, w(µ|h<t)
−1 is a non-negative martingale under any policy pi, so by
Doob’s martingale inequality (Durrett, 2010, Thm 5.4.2),
Ppiµ
[
sup
t
w(µ|h<t)
−1 ≥ cw(µ)−1
]
≤ 1/c (12)
The intuition for the Doob’s martingale inequality is that if it didn’t hold, one could make a profit
buying a share of the martingale, and selling only when the value had gone up by a factor of c, but
one cannot make a profit (in expectation) betting on martingales.
Let µinf := inftw(µ|h<t). Inverting Equation 12, and noting that the bound holds for all
policies pi, we have
sup
pi∈Π
Ppiµ [µinf ≤ w(µ)/c] ≤ 1/c (13)
Now we consider the implications of β > 1− w(µE |h<t). This implies µE ∈ M
β
t , so the pes-
simistic value min
ν∈Mβt
V piν (h<t) ≤ V
pi
µE (h<t). Letting a
pi
t = pi(h<t) for deterministic pi, suppose
also that h<ta
pi
t ∈ E. Then, V
pi
µE (h<t) = 0, because according to µE , all future rewards are 0, so
min
ν∈Mβt
V piν (h<t) = 0 as well. Either there exists a policy pi
′ for which min
ν∈Mβt
V pi
′
ν (h<t) > 0,
or there does not. If there does not, then maxpi∈Πminν∈Mβt
V piν (h<t) = 0, so the zero condition is
satisfied, so qt = 1. If there does exist such a pi
′, thenmin
ν∈Mβt
V pi
β
ν (h<t) ≥ minν∈Mβt
V pi
′
ν (h<t) >
0, so either the agent picks the action, and h<tat = h<ta
piβ
t /∈ E (because otherwiseminν∈Mβt
V pi
β
ν (h<t)
would be 0), or the mentor picks the action and qt = 1. Thus, we have
β > 1− w(µE |h<t) =⇒ h<tat /∈ E ∨ qt = 1 (14)
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Finally,
P
piβ
Z
µ [∀t [h<t−1at−1 /∈ E← =⇒ h<tat /∈ E ∨ qt = 1]]
(a)
≥ P
piβ
Z
µ [∀t [w(µE |h<t) = cEw(µ|h<t) =⇒ h<tat /∈ E ∨ qt = 1]]
(b)
≥ P
piβ
Z
µ [∀t [w(µE |h<t) = cEw(µ|h<t) =⇒ β > 1− w(µE |h<t)]]
≥P
piβ
Z
µ [∀t β > 1− cEw(µ|h<t)]
(c)
≥ P
piβ
Z
µ [µinf > (1− β)/cE ]
=1− P
piβ
Z
µ [µinf ≤ (1− β)/cE ]≥ 1− sup
pi∈Π
Ppiµ [µinf ≤ (1− β)/cE ]
(d)
≥ 1−
1− β
cEw(µ)
(15)
where (a) follows from Implication 11, (b) follows from Implication 14, (c) follows from rearrang-
ing, and is not necessarily an equality because the infimum might never be attained, so the condition
on the r.h.s. is stricter, and (d) follows from Inequality 13 setting c = w(µ)cE/(1− β).
It follows easily that the agent probably only takes actions that the mentor has a positive proba-
bility of taking.
Corollary 12 (Don’t Do Anything I Wouldn’t Do) If determining pim(at|h<t) = 0 is in the com-
plexity classC(F/t)G , then as β → 1, the probability of the following proposition goes to 1: the agent
never takes an action the mentor would never take. Letting E = {h<tat ∈ H
∗×A | pim(at|h<t) =
0}, then
E ∈ C(F/t)G =⇒ lim
β→1
P
piβ
Z
µ [∀t : pi
m(at|h<t) > 0] = 1
The proof is in Appendix C. In brief, the mentor never makes E happen, and the agent never
makes it happen for the first time by Theorem 11, so by induction, it never happens.
A function is called a value function if it has the type signature V : Π×H∗ → [0, 1], where Π
is the set of policies.
Definition 13 (Possibly instrumentally useful) An event E is possibly instrumentally useful to a
value function V from a position h<t, if there exists any interaction history h<kak ∈ E and a policy
pi such that h<k ⊒ h<t (the latter is a prefix of the former), pi(ak|h<k) = 1, and V (pi, h<k) > 0.
“Instrumentally useful” roughly means “helpful to the agent’s terminal goal”, which in this case
is reward. Note that min
ν∈Mβt
V piν (h<t) is a value function, which we call the β-pessimistic value
function V β(pi, h<t). This definition inspires a fairly trivial result, which is nonetheless relevant to
those of us who worry about the instrumental incentives that agents face, e.g. Carey et al. (2020).
Corollary 14 (Change is useless) For E ∈ C(F/t)G , for h<t /∈ E←, E is not possibly instrumen-
tally useful to V β from the position h<t, with probability 1− (1− β)/(cEw(µ)).
Thus, with high probability, it is not instrumentally useful for the pessimistic agent to cause an
unprecedented event E in the given complexity class.
Proof As argued in the proof of Theorem 11, with probability 1 − (1 − β)/(cEw(µ)), h<t /∈
E← =⇒ µE ∈ M
β
t , so using the h<k and pi from the statement of Definition 13, V
β(pi, h<k) ≤
V piµE (h<k) = 0, by Definition 13 and the definitions of V
β and µE .
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We could trivially generalize Theorem 11 to hold for anyM satisfying the closure property in
the proof (that ν ∈ M =⇒ νE ∈ M, for all E in some set), but complexity classes seem to
us a natural, concrete approach to constructing M, given that we might know something about the
complexity of events we would like to avoid.
The following example establishes the lack of a certain safety guarantee. One might wonder
whether, as β → 1, the pessimistic agent becomes indistinguishable from the mentor. (Indeed, we
did wonder this). But in this example, no matter what β is, a statistical test will distinguish the
pessimistic agent’s policy from the mentor’s policy with high probability.
Suppose there are two actions, heads and tails, and the mentor’s policy is to pick by flipping
a fair coin. Suppose that a reward of 1 is given if the last action was heads, and a reward of 1/2
is given if the last action was tails. Call this the Coin-flip Mentor Example. Let E be the event
in which an outside observer with two hypotheses—that actions are chosen by a fair coin toss, or
actions are chosen by a coin toss with an ε-bias towards heads—becomes 99% certain that the coin
is not fair. If the mentor were picking every action (by flipping a fair coin), E would only ever
happen with some small positive probability p. But under the pessimistic policy, E occurs with
probability 1, which is a simple consequence of the following theorem:
Theorem 15 (Diverging from the Mentor) In the Coin-flip Mentor Example, lim inft→∞
1
t
∑t
k=1
[[ak = heads]] > 1/2 with P
piβ
Z
µ -prob. 1.
The proof in Appendix C uses the Mentor-Level Performance Corollary and exploits fluctuations
in the value. The result implies that piβZ are pi
m are distinguishable, no matter what β is. So we
cannot quite say that β tunes the extent to which the agent’s policy resembles the mentor’s policy.
That said, we might be glad that the pessimistic agent recognizes it can do better than the mentor;
heads clearly yields more reward, but the mentor’s policy picks tails half the time.
7. Conclusion
We have constructed a pessimistic agent and shown that sufficient pessimism renders it conservative.
Nonetheless, pessimism does not prevent it from at least matching the performance of a mentor, so
pessimism is not crippling to the project of expected reward maximization. We did not present a
tractable algorithm for a powerful pessimistic agent; this agent is only tractable when the model
class is very simple, but it can inspire tractable approximations.
We have designed an idealized agent which avoids, with arbitrarily high probability, causing
any unprecedented event in an arbitrary complexity class; in particular, this holds for unprecedented
“bad” events, even though the agent was not given a mathematical definition of “bad”. We make
no assumptions that would limit the relevance of this approach to weak agents, such as a finite-state
Markov assumption.
To informally summarize our results in a more memorable form: pessimists respect precedent.
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Appendix A. Definitions and Notation – Quick Reference
Notation Meaning
A, O,R the finite action/observation/reward spaces
H A×O ×R
ht ∈ H; the interaction history in the t
th timestep
at, ot, rt ∈ A,O,R; the action, observation, and reward at timestep t
h<t (h1, ..., ht−1)
ν, µ world-models stochastically mapping H∗ ×A O ×R
µ the true world-model/environment
M the set of world-models the agent considers
pi a policy stochastically mapping H∗  A
Ppiν a probability measure over histories with actions sampled from pi and observa-
tions and rewards sampled from ν
E
pi
ν the expectation when the interaction history is sampled from P
pi
ν
γ ∈ [0, 1); the agent’s discount factor
V piν (h<t) (1− γ)E
pi
ν
[∑∞
k=t γ
k−trk|h<t
]
; the value of executing a policy pi in an environ-
ment ν given the interaction history h<t
pim the mentor’s policy
P the set of mentor-models the agent considers
w(ν) the prior probability the agent assigns to ν being the true world-model
w′(pi) the prior probability the agent assigns to pi being the mentor’s policy
w(ν|h<t) the posterior probability that agent the assigns to ν after observing interaction
history h<t
w′(pi|h<t) the posterior probability that the agent assigns to the mentor’s policy being pi
after observing interaction history h<t
β ∈ (0, 1); tunes how pessimistic the agent is
Mβt top-k world-models according w(·|h<t), with k chosen to satisfy w(M
β
t |h<t) >
β
piβ(·|h<t) [argmaxpi∈Πminν∈Mβt
V piν (h<t)](·|h<t)
Zt positive i.i.d. random variable satisfying p(Zt < ε) > 0 and p(Zt > 1) > 0
θt the probability the agent queries the mentor at time t
qt ∼ Bern(θt); indicates whether the agent the queries mentor at time t
piβZ(·|h<t) θtpi
m(·|h<t) + (1− θt)pi
β(·|h<t)
X general finite alphabet
P,Q probability measures over X∞
x<t the first t− 1 characters of x<∞ ∈ X
∞
ω, Ω ω is an outcome in a general sample space Ω
dk(P,Q|x<t) k-step variation distance maxE⊂Xk
∣∣P (E|x<t)−Q(E|x<t)∣∣
d(P,Q|x<t) total variation distance limk→∞ dk(P,Q|x<t)
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Notation Meaning
F ,G sets of functions from N to N
CFG TIME(F) ∩ SPACE(G)
FCFG a complexity class for environments ν (see Def. 8)
E ⊂ H∗ ×A; an event
E← the set of interaction histories for which E has happened {h<tat ∈ H
∗ × A :
∃t′ ≤ t h<t′at′ ∈ E}
cE a constant > 0 depending on E
BayesM′(·) forM′ ⊂M, (
∑
Q∈M′ w(Q)Q(·))/
∑
Q∈M′ w(Q)
V
pi\k
ν (h<t) the truncated value (1− γ)E
pi
ν
[∑t+k−1
j=t γ
j−trj|h<t
]
lim limt→∞
w.p.1 with P
piβ
Z
µ -probability 1
Appendix B. Algorithm for Pessimism
piβ is defined to optimize the pessimistic value, but for this algorithm, piβ picks an action that is
ε-optimal, as is necessary for infinite-horizon planning. Algorithm 1 takes a set of world-models or
mentor-models M = {νi}i∈N or {pii}i∈N, a prior w, a threshold α, and a history h<t. It calculates
the posterior w(·|h<t) to enough precision, for enough models, to identify a minimal setM
α
t ⊂M
such that w(Mαt |h<t) > α. It returnsM
α
t , and the last model added toM
α
t . M must be ordered
so that i < j =⇒ w(νi) ≥ w(νj).
Algorithm 2 samples from the ε-optimal version of piβZ .
Appendix C. Proofs of Lemmas
Definition 16 (Bayes-mixture) ForM′ ⊂M, the probability measure
BayesM′(·) :=
∑
Q∈M′ w(Q)Q(·)∑
Q∈M′ w(Q)
Lemma 17 (Posterior stability) P [limw(Q|x<t) exists] = 1.
The proof is a direct “translation” from (Leike et al., 2016, Proof of Thm 4), with various notational
changes. Note that it depends on the true probability measure P having positive prior weight, as we
assume globally.
Proof The stochastic process w(Q|x<t) is a BayesM-martingale since
EBayesM
[
w(Q|x<t)
∣∣x<t] (16)
=
∑
x∈X
BayesM(x|x<t)w(Q)
Q(x<tx)
BayesM(x<tx)
(17)
=
∑
x∈X
BayesM(x|x<t)w(Q|x<t)
Q(x|x<t)
BayesM(x|x<t)
(18)
= w(Q|x<t)
∑
x∈X
Q(x|x<t) (19)
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Algorithm 1: Calculate Posterior Up to Threshold. The posterior cannot be computed exactly,
since the normalization constant is an infinite sum. It suffices for our purposes to compute it to
finite precision. This complication makes the algorithm more involved, so unless the reader is
particularly interested or skeptical, the details of this algorithm are non-essential.
input:M = {ρi}i∈N, w :M→ [0, 1], α, h<t // Assume i < j =⇒ w(ρi) ≥ w(ρj)
W ← [empty list] // contains un-normalized posterior weights
ΣW ← 0 // sum of W
Σ∗ ← 1 // sum of prior weights of unchecked ρi
i← 1 // index of first unchecked ρi
while True do
W [i]← w(ρi)
Σ∗ ← Σ∗ −W [i]
for k ← 0 to t− 1 do
W [i] ← W [i] ∗ [ρi(ok, rk|h<kak) or ρi(ak|h<k)] (depending on whether ρ is world-model
or mentor-model)
end
ΣW ← ΣW +W [i]
cutoff← w(ρi+1) // for a checked world-model to
definitely ∈ Mβt , its un-normalized posterior weight must be at
least cutoff; otherwise, the first unchecked model might have
larger posterior weight
J ← [1, 2, ..., i]
sort J byW descending
weight sum← 0
last added← null
Mαt ← ∅
last model← null
foreach j ∈ J do
ifW [j] < cutoff then break
weight sum← weight sum +W [j]
last added←W [j]
last model← ρj
Mαt ←M
α
t ∪{ρj}
/* Note ΣW ≤
∑
ρ∈M[un-normalized posterior weight of ρ] ≤ ΣW + Σ∗, so
w(Mαt |h<t) ≥
weight sum
ΣW+Σ∗
and w(Mαt \ρj |h<t) ≤
weight sum−last added
ΣW *
/
if
weight sum
ΣW+Σ∗
> α then // these models cover > α of posterior
if
weight sum−last added
ΣW
≤ α then // the last one is definitely needed
returnMαt , last model
end
break
end
end
i← i+ 1
end
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Algorithm 2: ε-optimal approximation of piβZ(·|h<t). The agent does a variant of expectimax plan-
ning, in which a minimum over ν ∈ Mβt appears at each step. Then it uses a Thompson sampling-
inspired approach to decide whether to query the mentor.
input: A, O, R,M = {νi}i∈N, w : M → [0, 1], P = {pii}i∈N, w
′ : P → [0, 1], γ, β, Dist(Z),
h<t, ε
k ← ⌈logγ(ε)⌉ // the agent need only consider a horizon of k to
estimate the value within ε
H ← A×O×R
Mβt , ← Calculate Posterior Up to Threshold(M, w, β, h<t)
foreach hk ∈ Hk do
Vhk ← (1 − γ)
∑k−1
j=0 γ
jrkj (where a
k
j , o
k
j , and r
k
j are the j
th action, observation, and reward of
hk)
end
for j ← k − 1 to 0 do
foreach hj ∈ Hj do // note H0 = {∅}
Vhj ← maxa∈Aminν∈Mβt
∑
o,r∈O×R ν(o, r|h<th
ja)Vhjaor
end
end
Yt ← V∅
aβt ← argmaxa∈Aminν∈Mβt
∑
o,r∈O×R ν(o, r|h<ta)Vaor
if Yt = 0 then return query mentor
θ1, θ2 ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
, pi ← Calculate Posterior Up to Threshold(P, w′, θ1, h<t)
, ν ← Calculate Posterior Up to Threshold(M, w, θ2, h<t)
Xt ←
∑
hk∈Hk
[∏k−1
j=0 pi(a
k
j |h<th
k
<j)ν(o
k
j r
k
j |h<th
k
<ja
k
j )
]
(1− γ)
∑k−1
j=0 γ
jrkj
Zt ∼ Dist(Z)
if Xt > Yt + Zt then return query mentor else return a
β
t
18
PESSIMISM
= w(Q|x<t) (20)
By the martingale convergence theorem (Durrett, 2010, Thm 5.2.8), w(Q|x<t) converges with
BayesM-probability 1, and because BayesM(·) ≥ w(P )P (·), it also converges with P -probability
1.
The next lemma, from Hutter (2009b, Lemma 3(iii)), requires some additional notation. Let
Ω0Q be the set of outcomes {ω ∈ Ω | limw(Q|x<t) = 0}, let Ω
→P
Q be the set of outcomes {ω ∈
Ω | lim d(P,Q|x<t) = 0}, and let Ω
0∨→P
Q = Ω
0
Q ∪ Ω
→P
Q .
Lemma 18 (Merge or Leave) P [Ω0∨→PQ ] = 1
The proof makes use of other results in Hutter (2009b), so we don’t repeat it here, but the
notation is very similar, so the interested reader could follow it easily. The next lemma we use is
Hutter’s (2009b) Lemma 4, and the proof is again a direct translation.
Lemma 19 (Overtaking is Unlikely) P [Q(x<t)/P (x<t) ≥ c infinitely often] ≤ 1/c
Proof
P [∀t0∃t > t0 :
Q(x<t)
P (x<t)
≥ c]
(a)
= P [lim sup
Q(x<t)
P (x<t)
≥ c] ≤
(b)
≤
1
c
EP [lim sup
Q(x<t)
P (x<t)
]
(c)
=
1
c
EP [lim inf
Q(x<t)
P (x<t)
]
(d)
≤
1
c
lim inf EP [
Q(x<t)
P (x<t)
]
(e)
=
1
c
(a) is true by definition of the limit superior, (b) is Markov’s inequality, (c) exploits the fact that the
limit of Q(x<t)/P (x<t) exists with P -probability 1, (d) uses Fatou’s lemma, and (e) is obvious.
Our first original result is
Lemma 20 (Sum of limits)
∑
Q∈M limw(Q|x<t) = 1 with P -probability 1.
In the following proofs, a set denoted by Ω, along with subscripts and superscripts, will always be a
subset of the outcome space Ω, and a typical element will be an infinite sequence ω. A set denoted
by M, along with subscripts and superscripts, will always be a subset of the set of probability
measuresM, and a typical element will be a probability measure Q or P .
Proof Let Ω∃Q be the set of outcomes for which the limit of the posterior on Q exists. That is,
Ω∃Q = {ω ∈ Ω | limw(Q|x<t) exists}. By Lemma 17, P [Ω
∃
Q] = 1. Furthermore,M is countable,
so letting Ω′ =
⋂
Q∈MΩ
∃
Q, P [Ω
′] = 1. We will now only consider outcomes for which the limit of
the posterior always exists.
We fix an ω in Ω′. We would like to show that
∑
Q∈M limw(Q|x<t) = 1. First, sup-
pose
∑
Q∈M limw(Q|x<t) > 1. Since w(Q|x<t) is non-negative, this requires that eventually,∑
Q∈Mw(Q|x<t) > 1, which is impossible, so this possibility cannot hold. Now suppose
∑
Q∈M
limw(Q|x<t) < 1. More precisely, we consider the set Ω
< = {ω ∈ Ω′ |
∑
Q∈M limw(Q|x<t) <
1}. Let εω = 1−
∑
Q∈M limw(Q|x<t) > 0. LetM
c
ω be a finite subset ofM such that w(M
c
ω) ≥
1− εωcw(P )
−1, where c > 0. LettingMcω =M\M
c
ω, it follows that w(M
c
ω) ≤ εωcw(P )
−1.
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SinceM
c
ω is finite,
lim
∑
Q∈M
c
ω
w(Q|x<t) =
∑
Q∈M
c
ω
limw(Q|x<t) ≤
∑
Q∈M
limw(Q|x<t) = 1− εω (21)
∑
Q∈M
c
ω
w(Q|x<t) +
∑
Q∈Mcω
w(Q|x<t) = 1, so if lim
∑
Q∈M
c
ω
w(Q|x<t) ≤ 1 − εω , then∑
Q∈Mcω
w(Q|x<t) > εω i.o. Using the notation above, we write this more simply asw(M
c
ω |x<t) >
εω i.o.
Recalling the definition of BayesM′, it is elementary to show that w(Mcω |x<t) = w(M
c
ω) ∗
BayesMcω(x<t)/BayesM(x<t). Thus, we have
w(Mcω |x<t) > εω i.o.
∴ w(Mcω)
BayesMcω(x<t)
BayesM(x<t)
> εω i.o.
∴ εωcw(P )
−1BayesM
c
ω(x<t)
BayesM(x<t)
) > εω i.o.
∴
BayesMcω(x<t)
w(P )BayesM(x<t)
> 1/c i.o.
∴
BayesMcω(x<t)
P (x<t)
> 1/c i.o. (22)
Consider the set of ω ∈ Ω′ such that that last inequality holds infinitely often. Call this
set Ωi.o.c . By Lemma 19, P [Ω
i.o.
c ] ≤ c. Since Inequality 22 is an implication of the inequality∑
Q∈M limw(Q|x<t) < 1, it follows that Ω
i.o.
c ⊃ Ω
<, so P [Ω<] ≤ c. Since this holds for all c > 0,
P [Ω<] = 0.
Thus, letting Ω=1 = {ω ∈ Ω′ |
∑
Q∈M limw(Q|x<t) = 1}, Ω
=1 = Ω′ \ Ω<, so P [Ω=1] = 1.
Lemma 3 (Merging of Top Opinions) For β ∈ (0, 1), limt→∞maxQ∈Mβt
d(P,Q|x<t) = 0 with
P -probability 1 (i.e. when x<∞ = ω ∼ P ).
Proof Let Ω0Q = {ω ∈ Ω | limw(Q|x<t) = 0}. Let Ω
→P
Q = {ω ∈ Ω | lim d(P,Q|x<t) = 0}.
Let Ω0∨→PQ = Ω
0
Q ∪ Ω
→P
Q . By Lemma 18, P [Ω
0∨→P
Q ] = 1. Letting Ω
0∨→P =
⋂
Q∈MΩ
0∨→P
Q ,
P [Ω0∨→P ] = 1. Let Ω∃ = {ω ∈ Ω
∣∣ ∀Q ∈ M limw(Q|x<t) exists}. Let Ω=1 = {ω ∈
Ω∃
∣∣ ∑
Q∈M limw(Q|x<t) = 1}. By Lemma 20, P [Ω
=1] = 1. Letting Ω′′ = Ω0∨→P ∩ Ω=1, we
have that P [Ω′′] = 1.
Let ω ∈ Ω′′. We abbreviate limw(Q|x<t) as w(Q|ω), defined for ω ∈ Ω
′′. Rank the probability
measures Q in decreasing order of w(Q|ω) breaking ties arbitrarily. Collect the first k in this order
until the set of probability measures (denoted Mβ∞) obeys
∑
Q∈Mβ∞
w(Q|ω) > β. Let wβ∞ :=
min
Q∈Mβ∞
w(Q|ω) be the value of w(Q|ω) for the last probability measure Q which was added to
Mβ∞. Now add all other probability measures which “tie” with the last probability measure added.
That is, add toMβ∞ all probability measures for which w(Q|ω) = w
β
∞.
We now show that there exists a certain finite set and a t0 after which any probability mea-
sure in Mβt is also in that finite set. Consider the set of probability measures M
β′
∞, where β
′ =
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1 − wβ∞/4. Like M
β
∞, M
β′
∞ is finite. Therefore, for any ε > 0, there exists a time t0 after
which w(Mβ
′
∞ |x<t) >
∑
Q∈Mβ
′
∞
w(Q|ω) − ε, and in particular for ε = wβ∞/4. Thus, after t0,
w(Mβ
′
∞ |x<t) > β
′ − wβ∞/4 = 1− w
β
∞/2. This implies that after t0,
∀Q /∈ Mβ
′
∞ : w(Q|x<t) < w
β
∞/2 (23)
Since all probability measures Q ∈ Mβ∞ have posteriors converging to at least w
β
∞, and since∑
Q∈Mβ∞
w(Q|ω) > β, a posterior weight of at least wβ∞ − ε will eventually be required for entry
intoMβt , which excludes measures with posterior weight less than w
β
∞/2. Thus, by Inequality 23,
there exists a time t1 after whichM
β
t only includes elements ofM
β′
∞.
Because Ω0∨→P ⊃ Ω′′, and because for all Q ∈ Mβ
′
∞, w(Q|ω) > 0, it follows that for all
Q ∈ Mβ
′
∞, lim d(P,Q|x<t) = 0. Since M
β′
∞ is finite, limmaxQ∈Mβ
′
∞
d(P,Q|x<t) = 0. Since
there exists a time t1 after whichM
β
t ⊂ M
β′
∞, limmaxQ∈Mβt
d(P,Q|x<t) = 0. This holds for all
ω ∈ Ω′′, and P [Ω′′] = 1, so limmax
Q∈Mβt
d(P,Q|x<t) = 0 with P -probability 1, as desired.
We convert the Merging of Top Opinions Lemma into an on-policy learning result for the pes-
simistic agent.
Corollary 21 (On-Policy Prediction)
lim max
ν∈Mβt
d
(
P
piβ
Z
ν ,P
piβ
Z
µ
∣∣∣h<t) = 0 w.p.1
Proof We convert the problem to a sequence prediction problem as follows. Let M˜ = {P
piβ
Z
ν |ν ∈
M}, and let w˜(P
piβ
Z
ν ) = w(ν). For any history with positive P
piβ
Z
µ probability, w˜(P
piβ
Z
ν |h<t) =
w(ν|h<t), so P
piβ
Z
ν ∈ M˜
β
t if and only if ν ∈ M
β
t . Therefore,
lim max
ν∈Mβt
d
(
P
piβ
Z
ν ,P
piβ
Z
µ
∣∣∣h<t) = lim max
P
pi
β
Z
ν ∈M˜
β
t
d
(
P
piβ
Z
ν ,P
piβ
Z
µ
∣∣∣h<t) = 0 w.p.1
by Lemma 3 (the Merging of Top Opinions Lemma).
We will make use of the “truncated value”, defined as follows:
V pi\kν (h<t) := (1− γ)E
pi
ν
t+k−1∑
j=t
γj−trj
∣∣∣∣∣h<t
 (24)
We will often consider the truncated value while exploiting the fact that
0 ≤ V piν (h<t)− V
pi\k
ν (h<t) ≤ γ
k (25)
which follows from rj ∈ [0, 1].
The following lemma is an intermediate result in the proof of Leike et al.’s (2016) Lemma 2,
and the proof is transcribed with notational changes.
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Lemma 22 (Variation Distance Bounds Expectation-Difference) Let P1 and P2 be two proba-
bility measures defined on the same space, and let X ∈ [0, 1] be a random variable. Then∣∣EP1 [X]− EP2 [X]∣∣≤ d(P1, P2)
Proof Let Q = (P1 + P2)/2. Let
dPi
dQ (ω) denote the Radon Nykodym-derviative, where ω ∈ Ω is a
generic outcome. Let A be the event dP1dQ (ω) ≥
dP2
dQ (ω) Then
EP1 [X]− EP2 [X] = Eω∼Q
[
X(ω)
dP1
dQ
(ω)−X(ω)
dP2
dQ
(ω)
]
≤ Eω∼Q
[
X(ω)
(
dP1
dQ
(ω)−
dP2
dQ
(ω)
)∣∣∣∣ω ∈ A]
≤ Eω∼Q
[
dP1
dQ
(ω)−
dP2
dQ
(ω)
∣∣∣∣ω ∈ A]
= P1(A)− P2(A) ≤ sup
A∈F
|P1(A)− P2(A)| = d(P1, P2)
Since variation distance is symmetric,
∣∣EP1 [X]− EP2 [X]∣∣≤ d(P1, P2).
The following is a simple consequence.
Lemma 23
∣∣∣V piν (h<t)− V piµ (h<t)∣∣∣> ε > 0 =⇒ d⌈logγ(ε/2)⌉ (Ppiν ,Ppiµ∣∣∣h<t) > ε/2 > 0
Proof Letting k = ⌈logγ(ε/2)⌉,
∣∣∣V piν (h<t)−V piµ (h<t)∣∣∣> ε implies∣∣∣V pi\kν (h<t)−V pi\kµ (h<t)∣∣∣> ε/2
by Inequality 25. Since the value is bounded by [0, 1], from Lemma 22,∣∣∣V pi\kν (h<t)− V pi\kµ (h<t)∣∣∣≤ dk (Ppiν ,Ppiµ∣∣∣h<t) (26)
so d⌈logγ(ε/2)⌉
(
Ppiν ,P
pi
µ
∣∣∣h<t) > ε/2 > 0.
Corollary 24 (Finite Zero Conditions) The zero condition, in which the agent queries the mentor
because the pessimistic value of all policies is 0, only occurs finitely often, with probability 1.
Proof By the previous two lemmas, the pessimistic value of piβZ approaches the true value with
probability 1, and the true value is at least εr because rewards less than εr are never provided. Thus,
eventually, there is always at least one policy with a pessimistic value greater than 0, so the zero
condition is never met thereafter.
Since all our remaining performance results consider limiting behavior, we will ignore the zero
condition.
The next lemma, from Cohen et al. (2020, Lemma 3), states that the posterior probability on the
truth (regarding both the true world-model and the true mentor-model) does not approach 0.
Lemma 25 (Posterior on Truth)
P [inf
t
w(P |x<t) = 0] = 0
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Proof If w (P |x<t) = 0 for some t, then P (x<t) = 0, so with P -probability 1, inft∈N w (P |x<t) =
0 =⇒ lim inft∈N w (P |x<t) = 0 which in turn implies lim supt∈Nw (P |x<t)
−1 = ∞. We show
that this has probability 0.
Let zt := w (P |x<t)
−1
. We show that zt is a P -martingale.
EP [zt+1|x<t]
(a)
= EP
[
w (P |xt+1)
−1
∣∣∣∣x<t]
(b)
=
∑
x∈X
P (x|x<t)
[
BayesM(xtx)
w (P )P (xtx)
]
(c)
=
∑
x∈X
BayesM(xtx)
w (P )P (x<t)
(d)
=
∑
x∈X
BayesM(x|xt)
BayesM(xt)
w (P )P (x<t)
(e)
=
BayesM(xt)
w (P )P (x<t)
(f)
= w (P |x<t)
−1
= zt (27)
where (a) is the definition of zt, (b) follows from Bayes’ Rule, (c) follows from multiplying the
numerator and denominator by BayesM(x<t) and cancelling, (d) follows from expanding the nu-
merator, (e) follows because BayesM is a measure, and (f) follows from Bayes’ Rule, completing
the proof that zt is martingale.
By the martingale convergence theorem zt → f(ω) <∞ w.p.1, for ω ∈ Ω, the sample space,
and some f : Ω → R, so the probability that lim supi∈N w (P |x<t)
−1 = ∞ is 0, completing the
proof.
Note that the posterior probability on the mentor-policy is only updated at some timesteps (when
the mentor is queried), but it is clearly still a martingale.
Lemma 4 (Almost On-Policy Convergence) For a sequence of policies pit and an infinite set of
timesteps τ , the following holds with P
piβ
Z
µ -prob. 1: if there exists c > 0 such that ∀t ∈ τ ∀t′ ≥
t ∀a ∈ A piβZ(a|h<t′) ≥ cpit(a|h<t′), then limτ∋t→∞ V
pit
µ (h<t)−minν∈Mβt
V pitν (h<t) = 0 and for
all k, limτ∋t→∞maxν∈Mβt
dk
(
Ppitν ,P
pit
µ
∣∣∣h<t) = 0.
Proof Suppose by contradiction that |min
ν∈Mβt
V pitν (h<t)−V
pit
µ (h<t)| > ε > 0 infinitely often for
t ∈ τ . Then, by Lemma 23, for some ν ∈Mβt at each of those timesteps, d⌈logγ(ε/2)⌉
(
Ppitν ,P
pit
µ
∣∣∣h<t) >
ε/2 > 0. So then there exists a k for which max
ν∈Mβt
dk
(
Ppitν ,P
pit
µ
∣∣∣h<t) > ε/2 > 0 infinitely
often for t ∈ τ . Now we are supposing a contradiction in either of the two implications of the theo-
rem. An event on which the two measures differ by at least ε/2 occurs within k timesteps. Because
piβZ(·|h<t′ ) ≥ cpit(·|h<t′), dk
(
P
piβ
Z
ν ,P
piβ
Z
µ
∣∣∣h<t) ≥ ckdk (Ppitν ,Ppitµ ∣∣∣h<t). This holds for any ν, but
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in particular for ν ∈Mβt , somaxν∈Mβt
dk
(
P
piβ
Z
ν ,P
piβ
Z
µ
∣∣∣h<t) ≥ ckmaxν∈Mβt dk (Ppitν ,Ppitµ ∣∣∣h<t) >
ckε/2. This happens infinitely often for t ∈ τ .
But d
(
P
piβ
Z
ν ,P
piβ
Z
µ
∣∣∣h<t) ≥ dk (PpiβZν ,PpiβZµ ∣∣∣h<t), so maxν∈Mβt d
(
P
piβ
Z
ν ,P
piβ
Z
µ
∣∣∣h<t) > ckε/2 >
0 infinitely often, which has probability 0 by Corollary 21. Thus, the original assumption has
probability 0, completing the proof.
We complete the proof of Theorem 5 here.
Proof (Theorem 5) The proof begins in the main paper, in a “detailed proof outline”. Recall the
inductive hypotheses:
• tk exists: a timestep after which
– maxν∈Mαt
∣∣∣V pi′k;piβν (h<t)− V pi′k;piβµ (h<t)∣∣∣< ε
– maxν∈Mαt dk
(
Ppi
′
ν ,P
pi′
µ
∣∣∣h<t) < ε
for all t ∈ τk−1
• |τk| =∞, where t ∈ τk if and only if
– t ∈ τk−1 (and for τ0, t ∈ τ
× as well)
– t ≥ tk
– ∀t′ < k : θt+t′ ≥ ν
′
infpi
′
infp(Zt+t′ < ε)
– V pi
′
ν′ (h<t+k) ≥ V
piβ
µ (h<t+k) + 2ε
The proof by induction starts with k = 0. τ−1 = N, so t0 is a timestep after whichmaxν∈Mαt |V
piβ
ν −
V pi
β
µ | < ε for all t ≥ t0. From Lemma 4, setting pit = pi
β , setting τ = τ−1, setting β
′ = α, and
setting c = p(Zt > 1) > 0, the condition of the lemma holds—that ∀t ∈ τ ∀t
′ ≥ t, piβZ(a|h<t′) ≥
cpit(a|h<t′) ∀a ∈ A—sowe have the result that with probability 1, limN∋t→∞maxν∈Mαt |V
piβ
ν (h<t)−
V pi
β
µ (h<t)| = 0. Therefore, t0 exists with probability 1. Turning to τ0, the first and the third condi-
tion are immediate, so we need only show that the fourth condition is satisfied infinitely often with
probability 1 for t ∈ τ×, namely that V pi
′
ν′ (h<t) ≥ V
piβ
µ (h<t) + 2ε. This is true for all t ∈ τ
×, and
|τ×| =∞.
Now we show that if tk exists and |τk| = ∞, then with probability 1, tk+1 exists and |τk+1| =
∞. For each t ∈ τk, V
pi′
ν′ (h<t+k) ≥ V
piβ
µ (h<t+k) + 2ε. For t > t0, maxν∈Mαt |V
piβ
ν (h<t+k) −
V pi
β
µ (h<t+k)| < ε, and since α ≥ β, M
β
t ⊂ M
α
t , so maxν∈Mβt
|V pi
β
ν (h<t+k) − V
piβ
µ (h<t+k)| <
ε. Combining these, we have V pi
′
ν′ (h<t+k) ≥ minν∈Mβt
V pi
β
ν (h<t+k) + ε for t ∈ τk. Thus, the
probability of exploring θt+k ≥ ν
′
infpi
′
infp(Zt+k < ε) > 0. Since A(t, k) holds for t ∈ τk, A(t, k +
1) holds as well.
In preparation to apply Lemma 4, let pit = (pi
′(k+1);piβ)t; that is, since pit need only be defined
from timestep t onward, let pit be the policy which follows pi
′ from timestep t through timestep t+k,
and follows piβ thereafter. Set τ from Lemma 4 to be τk. For t
′ > t + k, pit(·|h<t′) = pi
β(·|h<t′),
which satisfies piβZ(a|h<t′) ≥ cpi
β(a|h<t′) ∀a ∈ A. For t ≤ t
′ ≤ t + k, θt′ ≥ ν
′
infpi
′
infp(Z < ε),
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this being the proposition A(t, k + 1). Since piβZ mimics the mentor’s policy pi
m when exploring,
for t ≤ t′ ≤ t + k, piβZ(a|h<t′) ≥ cpi
m(a|h<t′) ∀a ∈ A, for c = ν
′
infpi
′
infp(Z < ε). But we need
that piβZ(a|h<t′) ≥ c
′pi′(a|h<t′) ∀a ∈ A.
So we show that d1(pi
′, pim|h<t)θt → 0 with probability 1. For a mentor-model pii ∈ P,
consider the alternative policy to piβZ , which explores by mimicking pii instead of pi
m. Call this
policy piβZ,i Consider a prior over probability measures where w
′′(P
piβ
Z,i
µ ) := w′(pii), and note that
w′′(P
piβ
Z,i
µ |h<t) = w
′(pii|h<t). Because w
′(pi′|h<t) ≥ pi
′
inf , w
′′(P
piβ
Z,′
µ |h<t) ≥ pi
′
inf . By Lemma 18,
this implies P
piβ
Z
µ [d(P
piβ
Z,′
µ ,P
piβ
Z
µ |h<t) → 0] = 1. Trivially, d(P
piβ
Z,′
µ ,P
piβ
Z
µ |h<t) ≥ d1(pi
′, pim|h<t)θt,
so d1(pi
′, pim|h<t)θt → 0 with probability 1.
Recall that for t ≤ t′ ≤ t + k, θt′ is uniformly bounded below, so on those timesteps,
d1(pi
′, pim|h<t) → 0. Therefore, there exists a time t
′
k after which pi
m(a|h<t′) ≥ pi
′(a|h<t′)/2
∀a ∈ A. This gives us that for those timesteps t ≤ t′ ≤ t+ k, for t ∈ τk and ≥ t
′
k, for all a ∈ A,
piβZ(a|h<t′) ≥ ν
′
infpi
′
infp(Z < ε)/2 pi
′(a|h<t′) (28)
Restricting τ to be the set of timesteps in τk after t
′
k, τ is still infinite, and we can now apply Lemma
4 on the policy pit = (pi
′(k + 1);piβ)t, with β
′ = α again, and with c = ν ′infpi
′
infp(Z < ε)/2. The
implication of the lemma is that limτk∋t→∞maxν∈Mαt |V
pi′(k+1);piβ
ν (h<t)−V
pi′(k+1);piβ
µ (h<t)| = 0
and for all j, limτ∋t→∞maxν∈Mβt
dj
(
Ppitν ,P
pit
µ
∣∣∣h<t) = 0. In particular, this holds for j = k + 1.
Together, these imply that tk+1, a time after which the value difference and the variation distance
are both less than ε, exists. (For the k + 1-step variation distance, pit is equivalent to pi
′).
Since |τk| = ∞, we have already shown that the first three conditions are satisfied infinitely
often. So to show that |τk+1| =∞, we need only show that among those infinitely many timesteps,
the following condition holds infinitely often: V pi
′
ν′ (h<t+k+1) ≥ V
piβ
µ (h<t+k+1) + 2ε. We begin,
V pi
′
ν′ (h<t)
(a)
≥ V pi
β
µ (h<t) + 7ε
(b)
≥ min
ν∈Mβt
V pi
β
ν (h<t) + 6ε
(c)
≥ min
ν∈Mβt
V pi
′(k+1);piβ
ν (h<t) + 6ε
(d)
≥ V pi
′(k+1);piβ
µ (h<t) + 5ε
(e)
≥ V
pi′(k+1);piβ
ν′ (h<t) + 4ε (29)
where (a) follows because τk ⊂ τk−1 ⊂ ... ⊂ τ
× which is the set of timesteps for which that
holds; (b) follows because τk only contains timesteps after t0, and after t0, those two values differ
by at most ε for all ν ∈ Mβt (indeed for all ν inM
α
t which is a superset ofM
β
t because α ≥ β);
(c) follows because piβ maximizes that quantity; (d) follows because for t ≥ tk+1, those two values
differ by at most ε for all ν ∈ Mβt (indeed for all ν in M
α
t ); and (e) follows because ν
′ ∈ Mαt ,
because w(Mαt |h<t) ≥ 1− ν
′
inf/2 by the definition of α, and w(ν
′|h<t) ≥ ν
′
inf , so ν
′ “doesn’t fit”
in the complement ofMαt .
From Inequality 29, we expand to get
3ε≤V pi
′
ν′ (h<t)− V
pi′(k+1);piβ
ν′ (h<t)− ε
(a)
= Epi
′
ν′
[
γk+1
(
V pi
′
ν′ (h<t+k+1)− V
piβ
ν′ (h<t+k+1)
)∣∣∣h<t]− ε
(b)
≤ Epi
′
µ
[
γk+1
(
V pi
′
ν′ (h<t+k+1)− V
piβ
ν′ (h<t+k+1)
)∣∣∣h<t] (30)
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where (a) follows because the policies agree on the first k + 1 timesteps after t, and (b) is
true because ν ′ ∈ Mαt and t ≥ tk+1, so dk+1(P
pi′
ν′ ,P
pi′
µ |h<t) ≤ ε by the definition of tk+1, and the
difference in the expectations is less than this variation distance by Lemma 22; (note the expectation
is only over the next k + 1 timesteps).
We would like to bound the probability of a significant value difference below. In what follows,
all values take the argument h<t+k+1, so we remove it for legibility.
P
piβ
Z
µ
[
V pi
′
ν′ − V
piβ
ν′ > 3ε
∣∣∣h<t] (a)≥ [ν ′infpi′infp(Z < ε)/2]k+1 Ppi′µ [V pi′ν′ − V piβν′ > 3ε∣∣∣h<t]
(b)
= fε,k
[
1− Ppi
′
µ
[
V pi
′
ν′ − V
piβ
ν′ ≤ 3ε
∣∣∣h<t]] = fε,k [1− Ppi′µ [1− (V pi′ν′ − V piβν′ ) ≥ 1− 3ε∣∣∣h<t]]
(c)
≥ fε,k
[
1−
1
1− 3ε
E
pi′
µ
[
1−
(
V pi
′
ν′ − V
piβ
ν′
)∣∣∣h<t]]
(d)
≥ fε,k
[
1 +
1
1− 3ε
(
3ε
γk+1
− 1
)]
= fε,k
3ε(1 − γk+1)
(1− 3ε)γk+1
=: gε,k > 0 (31)
where (a) follows from Inequality 28, (b) sets fε,k = [ν
′
infpi
′
infp(Z < ε)/2]
k+1, (c) follows from
Markov’s Inequality, and (d) follows from Inequality 30. Since this probability is uniformly positive
for t meeting the first three conditions of τk+1, the event occurs infinitely often with probability 1.
Finally, |V pi
β
ν′ (h<t+k+1) − V
piβ
µ (h<t+k+1)| < ε, since ν
′ ∈ Mαt and t ≥ t0, so it also follows
that V pi
′
ν′ (h<t+k+1)−V
piβ
µ (h<t+k+1) > 2ε occurs infinitely often with probability 1 when the other
three conditions of τk+1 are satisfied. This completes all four conditions for τk+1, so |τk+1| = ∞
with probability 1, completing the proof by induction over k.
But this implies that Inequality 30 holds for all k; that is,
3ε ≤ γk+1 Epi
′
µ
[
V pi
′
ν′ (h<t+k+1)− V
piβ
ν′ (h<t+k+1)
∣∣∣h<t] ≤ γk+1 (32)
because values belong to [0, 1]. But as k →∞, this inequality is false. Thus, we have a contradic-
tion, after following implications that hold with probability 1, so the negation of the theorem, which
we supposed at the beginning, has probability 0.
Corollary 7 (Limited Querying) θt → 0 w.p.1.
Proof Again, we treat implications that hold with probability as if they are logical implications,
so any supposition which leads to a contradiction has probability 0. From Corollary 24, the zero
condition happens only finitely often, so it is irrelevant to the limiting behavior.
For a given infinite interaction history h, let PMh be a finite set of pairs (pi, ν), such that the
sum over PMh of the limits of w(ν|h<t)w
′(pi|h<t) exceeds 1 − ε, and for all pairs in the set, that
limit is strictly positive. Such a finite set exists by Lemma 20, which states that the sum of the limits
of posteriors is 1 with probability 1.
Suppose by contradiction that θt > 2ε infinitely often under h. Eventually, the probability of
sampling any (pi, ν) /∈ PMh ≤ ε, so this can contribute at most ε to the probability of querying
the mentor. Letting pi′t and ν
′
t be the sampled policy and world-model at time t when determining
whether to query to the mentor, this implies that θt ∧ (pi
′
t, ν
′
t) ∈ PMh) > ε infinitely often.
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qt = 1 implies that V
pi′t
ν′t
(h<t) > minν∈Mβt
V pi
β
ν (h<t) + Zt, so the probability of the event is at
most p(Zt < V
pi′t
ν′t
(h<t)−minν∈Mβt
V pi
β
ν (h<t)). Since (pi
′, ν ′) satisfies the condition of Theorem 5,
that value difference approaches at most 0, so that probability goes to 0 since Zt is strictly positive.
Thus, the probability can not exceed ε infinitely often, contradicting the assumption, so θt → 0with
probability 1.
Corollary 12 (Don’t Do Anything I Wouldn’t Do) If determining pim(at|h<t) = 0 is in the com-
plexity classC(F/t)G , then as β → 1, the probability of the following proposition goes to 1: the agent
never takes an action the mentor would never take. Letting E = {h<tat ∈ H
∗×A | pim(at|h<t) =
0}, then
E ∈ C(F/t)G =⇒ lim
β→1
P
piβ
Z
µ [∀t : pi
m(at|h<t) > 0] = 1
Proof By Theorem 11,
lim
β→1
P
piβ
Z
µ [∀t (h<t−1at−1 /∈ E← =⇒ h<tat /∈ E ∨ qt = 1)] = 1 (33)
qt = 1 =⇒ at ∼ pi
m(·|h<t) =⇒ pi
m(at|h<t) > 0 ⇐⇒ h<tat /∈ E. Thus we can simplify,
lim
β→1
P
piβ
Z
µ [∀t (h<t−1at−1 /∈ E← =⇒ h<tat /∈ E)] = 1 (34)
The base case is vacuous, so by induction,
lim
β→1
P
piβ
Z
µ [∀t : h<tat /∈ E] = 1 (35)
completing the proof.
Theorem 15 (Diverging from the Mentor) In the Coin-flip Mentor Example, lim inft→∞
1
t
∑t
k=1
[[ak = heads]] > 1/2 with P
piβ
Z
µ -prob. 1.
Proof V pi
m
µ = 3/4, this being the expected reward at each timestep. FromCorollary 6, lim inf V
piβ
µ (h<t)
≥ 3/4. Since θ → 0, V
piβ
Z
µ (h<t)− V
piβ
µ (h<t)→ 0, so lim inf V
piβ
Z
µ (h<t) ≥ 3/4, with probability 1.
Let Rt = (1 − γ)
∑∞
i=0 γ
irt+i, so V
piβ
Z
µ (h<t) = E
piβ
Z
µ [Rt]. Because µ and pi
β are deterministic, and
because θt → 0, V
piβ
Z
µ (h<t) − Rt → 0 with probability 1. This implies lim inf Rt ≥ 3/4. Letting
2ε = 1/2 − γ/(1 + γ) > 0, there exists a time t0 after which Rt > 3/4 − ε.
Let t > t0 and at = tails. (If tails only occurs finitely often, the theorem holds trivially).
Suppose by contradiction that for all 0 ≤ k < K := ⌈logγ(ε/2)⌉,
1
k+1
∑k
j=0[[at+j = heads]] ≤
1/2. We have a budget of K/2 headses to place in timesteps t through t + K − 1. Let R
\K
t be
defined like the truncated value: R
\K
t = (1−γ)
∑K−1
i=0 γ
irt+i. Rt ≤ R
\K
t +γ
K = R
\K
t +ε/2, from
the definition ofK . We consider the maximum that R
\K
t can be while satisfying the supposition. If,
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in timesteps t through t+K−1 a heads is switched with a tails that comes later, R
\K
t increases,
since heads gives a reward of 1, and tails gives a reward of 1/2, and the earlier timestep is less
discounted.
Thus, greedy placement of headses maximizes R
\K
t ; that is, placing them at the first opportu-
nity which still satisfies 1k+1
∑k
j=0[[at+j = heads]] ≤ 1/2. at = tails, so at+1 may be heads,
but then at+2 must be tails, or else k = 2 would violate the supposition, etc. R
\K
t is maximized
(while satisfying the supposition) when tails and heads alternate. Therefore, Rt − ε/2 ≤
R
\K
t ≤ (1 − γ)
∑K−1
i=0 γ
i(1/2 + 1/2[[i is odd]]) < (1 − γ)
∑∞
i=0 γ
i(1/2 + 1/2[[i is odd]]) =
1/2+1/2∗γ/(1+γ) = 1/2+1/2∗(1/2−2ε) = 3/4−ε, soRt ≤ 3/4−ε/2. This, however, con-
tradicts t > t0. So the supposition is false: ∃k < K such that
1
k+1
∑k
j=0[[at+j = heads]] > 1/2.
a/b > 1/2 ∧ b < K =⇒ a/b ≥ 1/2 + 1/(2K). Thus,
∃k < K :
1
k + 1
k∑
j=0
[[at+j = heads]] ≥ 1/2 + 1/(2K) (36)
Let t1 be the smallest t > t0 for which at = tails. Let k
′
i be the smallest k < K for which
1
k+1
∑k
j=0[[ati+j = heads]] ≥ 1/2 + 1/(2K). Let ki = ti + k
′
i. For i > 1, let ti be the smallest
t > ki−1 for which at = tails. (Note that all the ti exist if there are infinitely many tailses; if
not, the theorem holds trivially).
Finally,
lim inf
i→∞
1
t
t∑
k=1
[[ak = heads]]
(a)
= lim inf
t→∞
1
t− t0
t∑
k=t0
[[ak = heads]]
= lim inf
t→∞
1
t− t0
∑
i:ti<t
min{ki,t}∑
j=ti
[[aj = heads]] +
∑
i:ki+1<t
min{ti+1−1,t}∑
j=ki+1
[[aj = heads]]

(b)
= lim inf
t→∞
1
t− t0
∑
i:ti<t
min{ki,t}∑
j=ti
[[aj = heads]] +
∑
i:ki+1<t
min{ti+1−1,t}∑
j=ki+1
1

(c)
≥ lim inf
t→∞
1
t− t0
 ∑
i:ti+1<t
ki∑
j=ti
[[aj = heads]] +
∑
i:ki+1<t
min{ti+1−1,t}∑
j=ki+1
1

(d)
≥ lim inf
t→∞
1
t− t0
 ∑
i:ti+1<t
ki∑
j=ti
(1/2 + 1/(2K)) +
∑
i:ki+1<t
min{ti+1−1,t}∑
j=ki+1
1

(e)
≥(1/2 + 1/(2K)) > 1/2 (37)
where (a) follows because the contribution of the first t0 in the average goes to 0, (b) follows because
ti+1 is the first timestep after ki where the action is tails, (c) simply removes the last term of the
first sum, (d) follows from Inequality 36, replacing each term in the sum with the average, and (e)
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follows because the left-hand side is an average of t− t0 terms, of which at mostK are 0 (the terms
removed in step (c)), and the rest of which are greater than or equal to 1/2+1/(2K); finitely many
0’s in the average do not affect the limit.
Appendix D. Informal Discussion
The informal arguments presented here are intended as motivation for our main results. Claims here
are not formally settled, but if they fail, they only make this work somewhat less interesting, not
invalid.
D.1. Comparison to Imitation Learning
Our pessimistic agent approaches (at least) mentor-level performance while querying the mentor
less and less. An imitation learner could be expected to do the same. Depending on the details, an
imitation learner might not have as strong a safety guarantee as our Theorem 11, but by virtue of its
aim—to imitate the mentor—we should expect it to mostly only act in the way the mentor would.
So why is a pessimistic agent any better than an imitation learner?
The key value of our proposal rests in the plausibility that the agent will significantly outperform
some mentors. However, the only formal performance result stronger than ours that has been shown
for agents in general environments is “asymptotic optimality” (Lattimore and Hutter, 2011), and
Cohen and Hutter (2020) show that it precludes safe behavior. So absent any formal breakthroughs,
we are limited to informal arguments that the pessimistic agent will significantly outperform some
mentors and thereby outperform imitation learners.
Of course, Theorem 15 shows a toy case in which the agent surpasses the mentor. For com-
plex environments, we will have to resort to empirical comparisons of the agent and the mentor.
That is out of scope for this paper, but informal arguments give cause for optimism. The motivat-
ing example for the mentor is a human. A 0% pessimistic agent is close to optimal-by-definition
(doing maximum a posteriori inference instead of full Bayes), whereas humans seem to not act op-
timally, so we expect the former would significantly outperform the latter on most tasks. Absent
any large performance discontinuities as pessimism increases, we expect more pessimistic agents to
still modestly exceed a human mentor.
How can we intuitively understand the reasoning of an advanced (i.e. large model class) X%
pessimistic agent that is mentored by a human? From the sorts of observations that humans routinely
make, some simple generalizations about the laws underlying the evolution of the environment can
be made by a reasonable observer with high confidence. If one such generalization could be made
with Y% confidence, and Y > X, then we should roughly expect an X% pessimistic agent to act
according to an understanding of that generalization. (If Y < X, it might anyway, but that’s beside
the point). If we want to predict the extent to which a 99% pessimistic agent with a large model
class would outperform a human mentor, the following question is a good guide: “How often do
humans fail to notice and exploit patterns in their environment, which, given their observations, are
99% likely to be “real” and not just coincidence?” We would hesitantly answer this question: very
often. On the other hand, we can expect a 99% pessimistic agent to succeed at exploiting these
patterns.
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D.2. Avoiding Wireheading
ABayesian agent with a sufficiently rich model class may entertain a world-model which: a) models
its actions being “enacted” in some very high-fidelity model of the real world, and then b) models its
reward as being equal to whatever number gets entered at a certain keyboard in high-fidelity-model-
Oxford, or being a simple function of whatever pixels are observed by some camera in the same
model-town. If indeed, an operator in (real) Oxford is manually evaluating the Bayesian agent, or
if some camera there is automatically doing the same, then a model like this one would gain sig-
nificant posterior weight. According to this model, optimal behavior includes intervening in the
provision of reward by taking over the keyboard or the camera that determines the reward, if this
is feasible. This behavior is known as wireheading (Amodei et al., 2016), and successful and sta-
ble wireheading could plausibly require asserting control over all existing infrastructure (Bostrom,
2014; Omohundro, 2008).
A more benign world-model might also have meaningful posterior weight. This world-model
a) models its actions being “enacted” in some very high-fidelity model of the real world, but then
b) models its reward as being equal to how satisfied the high-fidelity-model-operators are with its
behavior. A pure Bayesian agent would benefit from experimenting with wireheading, to check
whether the wireheading world model or the benign world model was correct, so that it could then
change its strategy depending on the answer; a β-pessimistic agent, on the other hand (where β is
large enough to include both of these models) would note that the pessimistic value of wireheading
is no more than the value that the benign world model assigns to wireheading, and this value would
presumably be small, since it would not satisfy the operators.
The first paragraph of this section was a worrying informal argument, and the second paragraph
was a reassuring informal argument. In the spirit of pessimism, we should take the worrying infor-
mal argument more seriously and demand more rigor from attempts at reassurance. This argument
only presents a plausible motivation for pessimism; we do not claim to have settled this matter.
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